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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
COMMON LAW REMEDY
for NEGLIGENT ACTS of the DRUNK
TORTS - ICrASING RECOGNITION OF A Co ON LAW
REVEDY FOR NEGLIGENT ACTS OF THE DRumt:
PLAINTIFF V. LIQUOR VENDOR AND OTHERS
Woe unto him that giveth his neighbor drink, that put-
test thy bottle to him, and make him drunken aZso, that
thou mayest look on their nakedness!.
The Old Testament warning bespeaks both the law and the
personal liability: He who furnishes intoxicating drink must
also answer for the subsequent conduct of the drunk. On Janu-
ary 5, 1968, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled
in Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc.2 that a tavern owner soliciting
the motoring public was legally responsible for highway death
and other injuries caused by a drunken driver who shortly
before the accident was a patron of the bar and was served
while intoxicated. The decision marked almost a decade of
change.
At common law there was no recognized cause of action
against tavern owners or others for injuries caused by "in-
toxicated persons".8 The rationale behind the no-liability rule
I Habakkuk 2:15 (King James).
2 233 N.E.2d -18 (Mass. 1968).
3 Authorities generally agree the indicia of an "intoxicated
person" are subject to common knowledge and observation.
For example, in People v. Williams, 28 Misc. 2d 691, 215
N.Y.S.2d 841 (Binghamton City Ct. 1961) public intoxication
meant the impairment of a man's capacity to think and act
correctly due to the injestion of alcohol which caused a loss
of physical and mental control; in State v. Katz, 122 Conn.
Supp. 439, 189 A. 606 (Ct. Err. 1937) a person who staggered
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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NEGLIGENT ACTS OF THE DRUNK
stemmed from two theories: (1) Voluntary drinking, not the
sale or serving of liquor, was the proximate cause of intoxi-
cation and of any resultant injuries;4 and (2) Injuries to pa-
trons or third persons were too remote to be a foreseeable
consequence of furnishing someone alcoholic beverage.5 The
inebriate was directly responsible for his own intoxication and
for those negligent acts which injured himself or other per-
sons regardless of how he came to be drunk. Some jurisdic-
tions still follow this rule.6
in walking or running before and after entering store was
an 'intoxicated person' within a statute imposing penalty
for sale to intoxicated person. FuNK & WAGNALLS STAND.ARD
COLLEGE DicrTioNARY 406 (1963) defines "drunk" as being
affected with alcoholic drink to the extent of having lost
normal control over body and mental faculties. See also
Sapp v. State, 116 Ga. 182, 42 S.E. 410 (1902) which upheld
jury instruction on 'intoxication': A man must be so far
under the influence of intoxicating liquors that his acts,
words or conduct would be visibly and noticeably affected
when seen by the general public.
4 Comment, The Common Law Liability of Minnesota Liquor
Vendors for Injuries Arising from Negligent Sales, 49 Alm.
L. REV. 1154, at 56 (1965).
5 Comment, Common Law Liability of the Liquor Vendor, 18
W. REs. L. REv. 251, at 52 (1966).
6 See, e.g., Carr v. Turner, 283 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965).
Strict reliance on the no-liability common law rule even in
the face of state laws prohibiting sales by anyone to an
intoxicated person; Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246,
210 P.2d 530 (1949). An unlawful sale of liquor to minor not
the proximate cause of injuries resulting from defendant's
negligent driving; Stringer v. Calmes, 167 Kan. 278, 205 P.2d
921 (1949). Adopted the no-recovery rule; State ex. Tel.
Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951). Only a
statute can create a cause of action against liquor vendor
for sales to persons whose subsequent negligence or willful
wrong caused third party injuries; Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis.
66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939). Sale of liquor too remote to be proxi-
mate cause of injury caused by intoxicated motorist.
1968]
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The hiatus widened between the no-recovery concept and
the concurrent body of law on tort liability for negligence
holding the original actor responsible for the ultimate con-
sequences of his negligence so long as the chain of causation
was not broken by unforeseen criminal acts or intentional
torts. Conduct embodying a foreseeable risk to persons within
the chain of events set into motion would remain the proxi-
mate cause of the resulting injury. For instance, one who en-
trusts a dangerous instrumentality to another, like an auto-
mobile to a known bad driver or a firearm to a child, sets in-
to motion a chain of circumstances involving foreseeable risk
to third persons. An analogy was soon drawn between auto-
mobile and gun entrusting cases and cases where there was
a dangerous combination of an intoxicated driver and an auto-
mobile through an illegal sale of liquor.7 The concept began
to take root that a cause of action at common law should lie
against a liquor vendor based on duty, foreseeability of harm,
and proximate cause.8
7 Note, Torts-Liability of Tavern Keepers for Injurious
Consequences of Illegal Sales of Intoxicating Liquors, 20 LA.
L. REv. 800, at 804-05 (1960).
8 See generally Connelly v. Jennings, 207 Okla. 554, 252 P.2d
133 (1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 921 (1953). Elements of
negligence necessary for recovery: A duty on the part of
the defendant to protect plaintiff from injury, failure to
perform that duty, and injury to plaintiff proximately re-
sulting therefrom.
Violation of a statute may constitute actionable negli-
gence if injury was the proximate result thereof and the
injured person was a member of the class intended to be
protected by the statute. See Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Stell,
190 Okla. 344, 124 P.2d 255 (1942).
Violation of a duty prescribed by statute is negligence per
se. See Owen-Osage Oil & Gas Co. v. Long, 104 Okla. 242,
231 P. 296 (1925); Whitehead Coal Mining Co. v. Pinkston,
71 Okla. 124, 175 P. 364 (1918) ; McAlester-Edwards Coal Co.
v. Hoaffar, 66 Okla. 36, 166 P. 740 (1917); Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry. v. Pitchford, 44 Okla. 197, 143 P. 1146 (1914).
Proximate cause is never presumed but is plaintiff's
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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In the interim, however, the legislatures of many states
enacted statutes called Civil Damage or Dram Shop Acts in
order to provide relief where there was none at common law.
The Dram Shop Acts expressly imposed strict civil liability
upon tavern keepers for the injurious consequences of illegal
or prohibited liquor sales,9 e.g., sales to minors and intoxicated
persons.10 Some of the statutes even allowed a cause of ac-
burden of proof. See Buxton v. Hicks, 191 Okla. 573, 131 P.2d
1015 (1943); Armstrong v. City of Tulsa, 102 Okla. 49, 226
P. 560 (1924).
Question of proximate cause is ordinarily one for the jury
unless all reasonable men would draw the same conclusion
making it a question of law for the court. See Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry. v. McCleary, 175 Okla. 347, 53 P.2d 555 (1936).
9 Comment, supra note 7, at 802. But see Cowman v. Hansen,
250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958). Dram Shop civil dam-
age act not applicable to sellers of less than 4% alcohol for
drinker's negligent driving of automobile and resultant tort.
See also Beck v. Groe, 245 1Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955).
No recovery allowed in action by husband against seller of
3.2 beer for wrongful death of wife in automobile accident
caused by intoxicated driver since statute defined 3.2 beer
as nonintoxicating and court did not recognize common-law
remedy.
10 Law of March 24, 1908, ch. 69, § 21, [1907-08] Okla. Laws
610 (repealed 1959), formerly codified as OKLA. STAT. tit. 37,
§ 121 (1951). The Dram Shop Civil Liabilities section im-
posed damages on the party supplying the inebriate with
liquor:
Every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other
person who shall be injured in person or property,
or means of support by any intoxicated p e r s o n
or in consequence of intoxication of any person,
shall have a right of action for all damages actually
sustained, in his or her, own name against any person,
individual or corporate, who shall by selling, barter-
ing, giving away, or otherwise furnishing intoxicating
liquors, contrary to the provisions of this chapter,
have caused the intoxication of such person. On the
19681
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tion by dependent relatives for loss of support.1 ' Under the
Dram Shop Acts, it was unnecessary to prove foreseeability
or to make an absolute showing of proximate cause. The in-
jured party only needed to establish the unlawful sale. Re-
covery was allowed if the liquor contributed even slightly to
the intoxication and the intoxication figured either directly
or remotely in the injury. Since a defendant was chargeable
under the statutes if he contributed in the slightest degree
to the intoxication, several tavern owners could be jointly
liable if the patron went from bar to bar prior to the negli-
gent act.12 Legislative intent in making it illegal to serve an
intoxicated person more alcohol was purposeful: Protect the
general public. The liquor vendor, as the original actor, was
deemed responsible for the ultimate injury because the liquor
not only put events into motion but disabled the inebriate
from either exercising caution or otherwise controlling his be-
havior.'3 Dram Shop Acts did not abrogate the law of com-
mon-law negligence and it remained a latent source of re-
trial of any such suit, proof that the defendant, or
defendants, sold, bartered, gave away, or furnished
any such liquor to such intoxicated person on the day,
or about the time (and prior thereto) of such injury,
shall be prima facie evidence that the liquor so sold,
bartered, given away, or otherwise furnished, caused
such intoxication. In any action by a married woman,
or other person legally entitled to recover damages for
loss of support, caused by such intoxication, it shall
only be necessary to prove that defendant, or defend-
ants, has or have given, bartered, sold or otherwise
furnished intoxicating liquor of any kind to such per-
son, during the period when such cause of action shall
have accrued.
1 Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup.
Ct. 1965).
1- Comment, Liability of Tavern Owners Under the New York
State Dram Shop Act, 30 ALBANY L. REv. 271, at 278-79
(1966).
13 Comment, supra note 4, at 1162-63.
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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covery against the liquor vendor for the acts of the intoxi-
cated vendee after leaving the premises.
The court in Adamian said the waste in h urm an life
caused by the negligence of drunken drivers on the highway
could not be left outside the scope of foreseeable risk created
by the sale of liquor to an already intoxicated person.14 The
statutory prohibition against sales to an intoxicated person15
was enacted to safeguard not only the intoxicated person but
members of the general public as well. This legislative policy
would not be rendered ineffectual simply because at the end
of the prohibition era the Dram Shop Act was repealed. Three
Sons, Inc. knew or should have known that its patrons ar-
rived by automobile and upon leaving the premises would
drive upon the public highways.'6 Accordingly, t h e court
held as error the sustaining of a demurrer by the lower court
on the ground that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of ac-
tion upon which relief could be granted.
Recognition of a common law negligence action by an
injured third party against a liquor vendor, sounded on the
theory that every person owed a general duty to every other
person not to set into operation an agency which would cul-
minate in harm, did not develop until the late 1950's. Even
the inebriate was precluded from suing to recover damages
for his own personal injuries unless at the time of the sale
1 Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 20 (Mass. 1968).
'5 Id., at 19. MAss. GEm. LAWS ch. 138, § 69 (1932):
No alcoholic beverage shall be sold or delivered on
any premises licensed under this chapter to a person
who is known to be a drunkard, to an intoxicated per-
son, or to a person who is known to have been intoxi-
cated within six months last preceding .... (Section
62 of the statute makes a violation of § 69 a criminal
offense).
Under Massachusetts case law, a violation of a criminal
statute is some evidence of the defendant's negligence as
to all consequences the statute was intended to prevent.
16 Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 19 (Mass. 1968).
19681
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he was so helpless as to be considered past the state of volun-
tary consent to the inebriation. 17 But Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Dep't Store' 8 engendered new perspective. A Michigan
citizen sought damages at common law and under Dram Shop
Acts for injuries sustained as a result of an automobile colli-
sion with a drunk who shortly before crossing over from Illi-
nois into Michigan was served by a drive-in tavern in viola-
tion of an Illinois statute forbidding sale of liquor to intoxi-
cated persons. After deciding that neither Dram Shop Act ap-
plied extra-territorially, the Waynick court said a common
law negligence action would lie on the tort principles of duty
and proximate cause since the serving of the liquor set off
a foreseeable chain of events for which the innkeeper was
ultimately responsible.19
Not long after Waynick, the New Jersey Supreme Court
rendered its landmark decision in Rappaport v. Nichols."
Here, the court allowed recovery solely on the common law
theory of negligence, New Jersey having repealed its Dram
Shop Act in 1934. The court held that a sale of liquor viola-
tive of statutory standards, under circumstances where the
tavern keeper knew or should have known the customer to
be intoxicated or a minor, created a recognizable and fore-
seeable risk of harm to the vendee and to the general public
thereby rendering the vendor liable as a tort-feasor to third
persons subsequently injured by the vendee. Several jurisdic-
tions have followed the Rappaport doctrine,21 though others
'1 Comment, supra note 5, at 255-56.
18 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960).
19 Id., at 326.
20 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
21 See, e.g., Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d
292 (1963). Tavern operator's sale of liquor to intoxicated
patron whose later negligence caused personal injuries to
another was actionable under common-law negligence rules
even had there been no Dram Shop Act in existence; Lee v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966) (dis-
7
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have rejected it.22
The commonplace use of automobiles prompted the Rap-
paport court to enunciate a standard of care incumbent upon
sellers of alcoholic beverages: Vendors must exercise reason-
able diligence and care to observe that they do not make
sales to patrons who are visibly intoxicated or to patrons who
senting opinion). Criticized theory that sale of liquor was not
a proximate cause of injury since the unlawful conduct of
sale was the cause-in-fact or the substantial factor which
produced the harm. Essence of "proximate cause" in statu-
tory violations was whether the risk and harm encountered
fall within the scope of the statute. Vere a statute was in-
tended to prevent harm to an intoxicated person and to
others, induced post-intoxication consumption falls within
the protection of the statute; Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge
No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964). Unlawful sale of
liquor by tavern to visibly intoxicated motorist was the
proximate cause of subsequent injuries to pedestrian; Smith
v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963). Serving of intoxi-
cants to minors or to visibly intoxicated persons in violation
of statute constituted negligence and if jury found unlawful
act was the proximate cause of injury, then violator liable;
Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960). Tavern
proprietor liable for injuries sustained by patron who was
victim of assault by another patron previously served while
intoxicated.
2 See, .e.g., Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328
(1966). Denied recovery to a patron who was served while
intoxicated and then was ejected from night club whereup-
on personal injuries were sustained when he wandered onto
adjacent highway. Statute making it unlawful to sell or
serve alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person did not
abrogate common-law rule of no-liability. Besides, patron's
act of drinking was contributory negligence and would bar
liability of night club owner. See also Carr v. Turner, 238
Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965). Rejected Rappaport doc-
trine by saying party injured in a collision with car driven
by drunk driver had no cause of action against tavern keep-
er whose unlawful sale of liquor caused intoxication. Stat-
utes delineating sales to certain prohibited classes of persons
did not change the common-law rule of no-liability.
19681
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are minors. Otherwise, the vendee's injurious acts to third
parties can be found by a jury to be a normal incident of
risk created by the vendor's unlawful sale. The court also ob-
served that one who negligently created a dangerous condi-
tion cannot escape liability for the natural and probable con-
sequences thereof by saying the act of a third person con-
tributed to the final result inasmuch as there may be two
or more concurrent efficient proximate causes of an injury.2
On the other hand, the defendant may assert as a defense
that he did not know or have reason to believe the patron
was intoxicated when served and that he acted as a reason-
able and prudent tavern operator under the circumstances.24
Most courts, however, would probably agree with opinions
reached in Dram Shop Act cases that the serving of one drink
in violation of the statute was enough to make the vendor
liable.25
In 1961, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Kyle
v. State6 upheld the conviction and $250 fine of a Holden-
ville liquor store dealer for the sale of alcoholic beverages to
an intoxicated person in violation of the Oklahoma constitu-
tion 27 and of the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Act 28
3 Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 8 (1959).
24 Id.
25 Comment, supra note 5, at 270. See, e.g., Tresch v. Nielsen,
57 Ill. App. 2d 469, 207 N.E.2d 109 (1965); cf. Pierce v. Al-
banese, 144 Conn. Supp. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (Ct. Err. 1957),
appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 (1957). But see Majors v. Brod-
head Hotel, Inc., 416 Pa. 235, 205 A.2d 873 (1965). Innkeeper
may avoid liability by proving customer was already so in-
ebriated when he arrived that the sale and consumption of
drink did nothing to worsen his already hopeless condition.
26 366 P.2d 961 (Okla. Crim. 1961).
27 OKLA. CONST. art. 27, § 5. It shall be unlawful for any licensee
to sell or furnish any alcoholic beverage to:
A person who is intoxicated.
* , * *.
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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with respect to Section 53729 and the penalty Section 538. °
Sheriff Abernathy of Holdenville arrested defendant K yl e
after Abernathy observed a "waddling and staggering" cus-
tomer enter the liquor store and soon afterwards leave with
a pint of Arriba wine. The customer was also arrested and
later pleaded guilty to a charge of public drunkenness. 3
The court in Kyle said liquor dealers are subject to more
Sales to . . . intoxicated persons shall be deemed a
felony.
28 OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 501-70 (1961).
29 OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 537 (a) (2) (1961). Under enumerated
prohibited acts, the statute provides, in part: "[N]o person
shall sell, deliver, or knowingly furnish alcoholic beverages
to an intoxicated person .... "
An increasing number of jurisdictions are recognizing that
violation of prohibitory statutes is a factor to be considered
in imposing liability based upon common-law principles.
See, e.g., Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963).
Sale of alcoholic beverage to minor in violation of statute
constituted negligence per se and automobile accident oc-
curring thereafter was reasonably foreseeable and the prox-
imate result of vendor's negligence; Majors v. Brodhead
Hotel, Inc., 416 Pa. 235, 205 A.2d 873 (1965). Violation of stat-
ute making it unlawful for licensee to sell liquor to one visi-
bly intoxicated was negligence per se and if jury found vio-
lation was proximate cause of injury to intoxicated person
or to another, licensee liable. But cf. Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa.
142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963). Guest sued hotel for injuries re-
ceived when he fell from ledge onto roof of hotel kitchen
after having been served by hotel bar while visibly intoxi-
cated. Inference that illegal serving substantially caused in-
jury could be rebutted by hotel in showing guest was so in-
toxicated when illegally served that accident would have
occurred anyway.
80 OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 538 (g) (1961). Proscribes felony pen-
alty for violation of § 537 (a) (2) as a fine of not more than
$1,000 or imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for not
more than 1 year, or both such fine and imprisonment.
81 Kyle v. State, 366 P.2d 964 (Okla. Crim. 1961).
19681
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than an ordinary degree of responsibility; in fact, it was in-
cumbent upon vendors of liquor to observe customers and not
to close eyes and ears to the commonly known, plain a n d
easily seen outward manifestations of intoxication. Liquor
dealers are not required, however, to subject customers to
tests which would disclose symptoms not readily apparent to
normal observation.32 In fashioning t h e legal requirements
which must be met to justify conviction under the statute,
Brett, J. held that the person to whom the sale was made
must be so far under the influence of intoxicants that his
conduct and demeanor are not up to standard and are rea-
sonably discernible to a person of ordinary experience. 33
Kyle set the parameters in Oklahoma. No reported case
to date goes beyond its reach, that is, from conviction under
the statute to a common law action to recover for third party
personal injury or property damage flowing as the natural
consequence of a negligent and unlawful sale of liquor. The
Oklahoma Legislature did not confine to j u s t liquor store
dealers the prohibitory language of Title 37 § 537 (a) (2),
which plainly reads: "[N]o person shall sell, deliver, or
knowingly furnish alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated per-
son . . ."34 Whether legislative intent can be found to en-
compass, as a matter of law, classes of persons both public
and private is open to question3 5 and awaits determination
by the Oklahoma courts.
32 Id., at 964-65.
33 Id., at 962.
34 OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 537 (a) (2) (1961).
35 See, e.g., Altenburg v. Commonwealth, 126 Pa. 602, 17 A. 799,
at 801 (1889). Construed a statute making it unlawful for
any person with or without a license to furnish by sale, gift
or otherwise liquor to persons visibly affected by drink and
held it applicable to individuals socially entertaining such
persons as well as to liquor vendors. The court said the law
does not restrain a man's private indulgence in drink but it
does take notice of public drunkenness so if a person has al-
ready passed the line of sober self-control, all men must take
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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The law in this area appears to be in metamorphosis,
slowly changing from the common law no-liability rule to the
newer concept of recovery under recognized principles of Tort
law. Though there is still a split among the jurisdictions,
those following recovery under the Rappaport doctrine rec-
ognized its application against liquor vendors who have vio-
lated state laws regulating alcoholic beverages. The doctrine
as yet has not been extended into the private social drink
sector under state laws prohibiting "any person" from sell-
ing or furnishing alcoholic beverages to an inebriate. One
day, a court will have to decide whether the danger and harm
notice of it and regulate their conduct according to the law.
A person may have liquor on his table ... that is his per-
sonal privilege. However, when he allows to assemble in his
barn men who are visibly intoxicated and sells or gives them
liquor while in that condition, the unlawful conduct affects
not only himself and his family but his neighbors and the
public as well. Thus, private indulgence can become the
public's harm and this the law is designed to prevent.
But see Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656
(1965). Construed a statute making it unlawful for 'any per-
son to sell or give away intoxicating liquor to a minor or
to an inebriate' and held it applicable only to liquor dealers
and not to a host who served cocktails in his own home. The
common-law theory of no-liability remained unchanged by
the statute; i.e., the proximate cause of third party injuries
was the individual drinker's consumption, not the vendor's
sale. Judicial interpretation of 'any person' was limited to
the public liquor trade and there was no finding that the
statute embraced the private sector as well. See also People
v. Bird, 138 Mich. 31, 100 N.W. 1003 (1904). Liquor laws are
aimed at the suppression of illicit or injurious traffic in in-
toxicants. No liability attached for furnishing liquor to a
friend or guest at a private residence as an act of kindness
or hospitality; Austin v. State, 22 Ind. App. 221, 53 N.E. 481
(1889). Although the home or private apartment cannot
shield a person from the penal code, appellant was not a
liquor dealer but furnished liquor to an adult friend as a
guest in private apartment and therefore was not subject to
the purview of the liquor control laws.
19683
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to the general public caused by the "intoxicated" drunk is
any less compensatory when, contrary to state law, the drunk
is furnished more alcohol by private persons acting as hosts
or drinking partners than when the drunk is sold more al-
cohol by a public liquor store.
The following is a synopsis of the law and arguments
an attorney in Oklahoma could use to support a client's ac-
tion against a third party for personal injuries caused by an
inebriate who was sold or served intoxicants while drunk.
I. PUBLIC SECTOR
A. APPLICABLE STATUTES (violation may be negli-
gence per se)
1. OKLA. CONST. art. 27, § 5. Felony to sell or furnish
alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person.
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 537 (a) (2) an d 538 (g)
(1961). Alcoholic Beverage Control Act makes it a
felony (maximum penalty of $1,000 fine and/or one
year imprisonment) for any person to sell, driver,
or knowingly furnish alcoholic beverages to an in-
toxicated person.
B. CASE LAW
1. Kyle v. State in which the Oklahoma C o u r t of
Criminal Appeals upheld the conviction and fine
of a liquor store dealer for violations of 1. and 2.,
above. The court laid down this test: Vendors must
observe a customer and must not make a sale when
it is apparent from normal observation and experi-
ence that the patron is intoxicated or drunk.
2. Rappaport doctrine and the Adamian decision hold
the liquor vendor liable under the common-law
tort theory of negligence; i.e., the unlawful sale to
visibly intoxicated patrons is the proximate cause
of foreseeable injury to others if t h e inebriate
drives on the roads.
II. PRIVATE SECTOR
A. Apply the Kyle test and argue the express language
of § 537 (a) (2) which prohibits any person (not just
[Vol. 5, No. 3
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liquor vendors) from knowingly furnishing alcoholic
beverages to an intoxicated person.
B. Show that the aim of the present Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act is but a continuation of the same long
standing public policy of the legislature to protect the
general public as evidenced by the earlier codification
of absolute liability in Oklahoma's former Dram Shop
Act.
C. Support the rationale with t h e Rappaport doctrine,
Adamian and other similar decisions, and the case of
Altenburg v. Commonwealth.
III. OBVIATE THESE DEFENSES
A. Old common-law theory of no-liability: Proximate
cause of injury is due to the individual drinker's volun-
tary consumption, not the sale or giving of alcohol by
another person.
B. Statutory prohibition aimed at the public sale of liquor,
not at its private use.
C. Defendant did not know or have reason to believe the
person was intoxicated and therefore acted reasonable
under the circumstances.
D. Drunk already so inebriated that the sale or serving
of drink did nothing to worsen his already hopeless
condition.
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